Reentrancy Auditor

When to Use

• Auditing external calls, token transfers, state management
• User mentions: reentrancy, ERC777, callback, CEI pattern, nonReentrant, external call, state update
• Analyzing call order, state synchronization, view functions
• Reviewing token transfer patterns, external integrations

Audit Workflow

IMPORTANT: Announce skill usage at the start of analysis

Begin with: "I'm using the audit-reentrancy skill to analyze this contract for reentrancy vulnerabilities..."

1. Scan for reentrancy vectors

   • Search: transfer, call, delegatecall, external, nonReentrant, ERC777, tokensReceived, onERC721Received
   • Focus: external calls, token transfers, state updates, callback hooks

2. Check against vulnerability patterns

   • Reference reference.md for complete checklist
   • Compare code against example.md

3. Validate exploitability

   • Check access control first - grep for onlyOwner|onlyAdmin|onlyGovernance modifiers
   • Can non-privileged actors exploit the reentrancy?
   • Are state updates after external calls?
   • Can callbacks reenter different functions?
   • Do view functions read stale state during reentrancy?
   • Can attackers control callback timing?
   • Verify no compensating protections exist
   • Downgrade severity if admin-only unless cross-function attack exists

4. Generate report

   • Use deliverable template below
   • Include attack flow and PoC
   • Rank by severity

Core Vulnerability Patterns

See reference.md for full checklist. Key patterns:

1. Token transfer reentrancy → ERC777/callback tokens allow reentrancy during transfers
2. State update after external call → transfer-before-update pattern enables draining
3. Cross-function reentrancy → reenter different functions to manipulate shared state
4. Read-only reentrancy → read stale state during reentrancy for profit

Code examples: See example.md

Severity Criteria

Critical: State updates after external calls enabling direct fund draining, cross-function reentrancy manipulating critical shared state, MUST be exploitable by non-privileged actors High: Token transfer reentrancy without nonReentrant protection, read-only reentrancy enabling price manipulation exploits, MUST be exploitable by non-privileged actors Medium: Partial CEI violations with limited impact, missing nonReentrant on non-critical functions, admin-only CEI violations with cascading impact Low: View function reentrancy without exploitable impact, theoretical reentrancy with no attack vector, admin-only CEI issues without immediate user impact

IMPORTANT: Admin-only functions (onlyOwner, onlyAdmin) with CEI violations are LOW severity unless:

• Admin function makes external calls that can reenter user-facing functions
• CEI violation enables governance attack to drain user funds
• Missing nonReentrant allows admin+user reentrancy combo attack

False Positives - Do NOT Flag

• Internal functions (not externally callable)
• View functions reading non-critical state
• Contracts explicitly designed for trusted tokens only
• External calls with documented reentrancy safety analysis
• Functions with nonReentrant modifier properly applied

Deliverable Format

MANDATORY: Before deliverable, verify each checklist.md item against codebase. Flag violations as findings.

Use template: templates/report-template.md

Each finding includes: severity, pattern #, file/lines, description, vulnerable code, attack flow, PoC showing fund draining, remediation.

Key Principles

• CEI pattern - Checks, Effects, Interactions (state changes before external calls)
• Mutex protection - nonReentrant modifier on state-changing functions
• Token awareness - assume any token can have callbacks
• Cross-function analysis - consider reentering different functions
• Read safety - view functions must handle reentrancy

Output Guidelines

DO:

• Reference specific lines and functions
• Provide complete attack flow with reentry point
• Show PoCs demonstrating fund draining
• Identify all shared state accessed
• Map cross-function reentrancy paths

DON'T:

• Report theoretical reentrancy without exploit path
• Flag internal functions (not exploitable)
• Ignore nonReentrant modifiers already in place
• Miss cross-function reentrancy (most common miss)